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Abstract 
 
The representation of the Arab world as “exceptional” (because of an absence of 
democracy) when compared with other regions of the world has permeated political 
science debates. Falling in line with Orientalist and culturalist theses, such interpretations 
read the region’s political evolution as the result of chaos, randomness and external 
events and view Arab societies as backward and tribal. Over the decades, these readings 
have become tightly intertwined with studies emphasizing an inevitable clash of 
civilizations. In this binary contraposition, the Arab world represents an underdeveloped 
and violent region, largely because of Islam. The interweaving of development and 
democracy, which started in modernization theory in the 1950s and 1960s, has become 
even tighter in the era of globalization: Development, especially through the actions and 
the buzzwords of international organizations such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, increasingly became synonymous with democracy. This 
paper will unpack the debate by focusing on its key elements. The intent is to show how, 
even as paradigms and the lexicon change, this debate is still anchored in a stereotypical 
and primordialist view of the entire region. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A map of the world’s democracies reveals the Middle East to be an outlier. 
While many of the countries across the globe that have experienced 
authoritarianism (for example, in Latin America and Eastern Europe) have 
undertaken democratization processes, albeit frequently with uncertain outcomes, 
this has not been the case in the Middle East. Despite the protest movements that 
have shaken this part of the world since 2011 (the so-called “Arab Spring”), the 
presence of democracy in the region, at least according to Freedom House or the 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index
1
, has remained problematic. Except for 
Tunisia, where protests led if not to a situation of full democracy then at least to 
an effective transition process, and Lebanon, with its controversial consociative 
system, the area overall remains dominated by authoritarianism
2
.  
Throughout the 1990s and the 2000s, cultural explanations, such the presence 
of Islam as an inhibitor of democracy, were adopted to explain the authoritarian 
resilience
3
. The impossibility of analysing the Middle East within the frame of 
democratization theory, which gained particular momentum after the the 
publication of Samuel Huntington’s book on the third wave of democratization4, 
has caused the region to be labelled as “exceptional” or, more generally, 
unsuitable for democracy. The narrative of “Arab exceptionalism” has spread 
largely in academia and politics to foster a certain representation of the Arab 
world by creating a negative and indelible label that is still in force today.  
In the following pages, I argue that this is the result of a combination of two 
elements: on the one hand, the spread and pervasiveness of a normative and 
procedural approach to democratization that, grounded in modernization theories, 
was conceived and described as an irreversible process – a set of mechanism that 
sooner or later would bring democracy, development and well-being to any 
latitude; on the other hand, a consequence of the previous argument, the need for 
democratization processes to be incentivized through appropriate tools. One of the 
results of this debate is the idea that democracy could be exported. As Nicolas 
Guilhot argues, the social and political movements promoting democracy and 
human rights have gradually become weapons in the arsenal of power
5
. He 
highlights how, especially after the Washington Consensus, these movements 
                                              
1
 See the maps and rankings by Freedom House www.freedomhouse.org and the Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index www.bti-project.org/en/home, among others (last accessed 27.05.2019).  
2
 We are well aware of the difficulty of giving a single name to the area and will refer 
interchangeably to the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) and the Arab world. Another 
crucial issue is how to define democracy, an issue that it is not possible to deal with in this paper.  
3
 E. Keddourie, Democracy and Arab political culture, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
Washington D.C., 1992; B. Lewis, A historical overview, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 2, 
1996, pp. 52-63; B. Lewis, Islam and liberal democracy, in The Atlantic Monthly, February, 1993.  
4
 S. Huntington, The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century, University of 
Oklahoma Press, Oklahoma, 1993. 
5
 N. Guilhot, The democracy makers: Human rights and international order, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 2005. 
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have become instruments for international actors and institutions to promote not 
only democracy and human rights but also, through them, their vision of the 
world. 
As a result, the promotion of democracy and, more generally, of 
democratization has become a sort of watchword to be “exported” rather than a 
set of values to be shared and safeguarded. This “crusade” for democracy has 
received the support of intellectuals, as well as think tanks, research centres and 
politicians. The construction of the narrative has been crucial to its success and its 
dissemination around the world. Encouraged by economic globalization, the 
promotion of democracy (along with good governance and participation) has 
become one of the main goals of international organizations. The World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund, as well as institutions such as the European 
Union, in accordance with the principle of conditionality, provide funds to 
developing countries in exchange for promoting democracy
6
. This had important 
consequences for the Middle East in terms of both representation and the political 
strategies that have been adopted to counter the “Arab exceptionalism”.  
In this paper, the academic debate surrounding “Arab exceptionalism” within 
the framework of democratization theory will be reviewed. However, this is not 
simply a theoretical exercise: It can tell us something relevant not only about the 
democratization processes per se but also, more generally, about the political 
mechanisms that have governed contemporary representations of the world. It is a 
historical and methodological excursus that proposes a consideration of the 
history of intellectual ideas and the impact of these ideas on the analysis (and 
representation) of a region and its population.  
 
2. Development “is” democracy 
 
The debate over the democratization – or, rather, the “non-democratization” – 
of the Middle East started in the aftermath of World War II within the frame of 
modernization theory. At the time, the social sciences were swept up by a wind of 
change whose goal was to build up universal knowledge capable of explaining 
certain areas and the social and political phenomena associated with them. The 
emergence of area studies played a significant role in giving credit to and 
strengthening the normative dimension of modernization theories. Modernity and 
the process it led to (i.e. modernization) took the form of a predefined trajectory 
that would transform traditional societies into modern societies. In this regard, 
structural theories, including the theories of modernization, have been useful in 
clearly identifying this process. In fact, they have focused on the institutional, 
economic, political, social and cultural structures that would permit the shift from 
tradition to modernity, from underdevelopment to development and from 
authoritarianism (identified with poverty and backwardness) to democracy 
                                              
6
 S. Carapico, Foreign aid for promoting democracy in the Arab world, in The Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2002, pp. 379-395. 
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(identified with high levels of development and modernity). The more such 
structures were present within a given context, the greater the possibility was for 
that context to reach modernity. According to this paradigm, in the study of 
modernization in the so-called “Third World” countries7, which embraces theories 
ranging from sociological and economic to anthropological and psychological 
approaches, evolutionary and functionalist aspects prevail. In a 1956 article 
entitled The Take-Off into Self-Sustained Growth, W.W. Rostow lays out a 
manifesto for the theory of modernization
8
. He compared the development and 
modernization process in developing countries to an aeroplane taking off: in a 
way that is gradual and unstoppable. Other theorists of modernization share the 
same theoretical assumptions: Modernization is the phase of a homogeneous 
process that, in short, is represented by Americanization or Europeanization. From 
the beginning, the close connection between social sciences and politics was 
evident. In fact, Rostow was asked to work as a consultant for the Lyndon B. 
Johnson administration immediately after the publication of his works. 
Post‒World War II transformations and the spread of the ideal of liberal 
democracy worldwide, as well as the paths of decolonization and the processes of 
people’s self-determination, led to a semantic transformation that nonetheless did 
not change the approach to the study of “other” contexts. Gradually, modernity 
was associated not only with high levels of economic development but also with 
increasing rates of democracy. This step is crucial and, as we will see, would have 
an impact on the development of the theory of democratic transition that, in the 
vast majority of the cases, consider the prerequisites crucial in leading a country 
towards democracy. 
Among the scholars who started to reflect on this correlation and married a 
functionalist approach to modernization, Lipset should be mentioned. Lipset 
dwells on the close correlation between economic development and modernity, 
the latter understood in the sense of the establishment of a democratic regime: The 
better a nation works, the greater the chances are of guaranteeing a stable 
democracy
9
. Lipset demonstrated the association between high economic 
performance and high levels of democracy by treating democracy, for the first 
time, as a dependent variable. Despite receiving multiple critiques
10
, Lipset’s 
                                              
7
 The general crisis of the model of modernization in the 1980s led to the collapse of the term 
Third World, along with the concept of third worldism, and the advent of the notion of developing 
countries. 
8
 W.W. Rostow, The Take-Off Into Self-Sustained Growth, in The Economic Journal, Vol. 66, No. 
261, 1956, pp. 25-48. 
9
 S.M. Lipset, Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political 
legitimacy, in American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 1, 1959, pp. 60-105. 
10
 For example, Larry Diamond (Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered, in G. 
Marks, L. Diamond (Eds.), Re-examining Democracy. Essays in Honour of Seymour Martin 
Lipset, Newbury Park, Sage Publications, 1992, pp. 93-139) demonstrates that the correlation 
between economic development and democracy was weaker in cases where the Human 
Development Index (HDI), at the same economic level, was used as an indicator of development. 
A. Przeworski et al. (A. Przeworski, M. Alvarez, J.A. Cheibub, F. Limongi, What makes 
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reflection and, above all, the fact that he substantiates his research with 
quantitative data, strongly contributed to the development of a normative 
approach to the study of modernization processes, which turned out to be crucial 
for studies on democratization.  
Other scholars who may also be cited for their structuralist approach have 
emphasized the importance of social structures to a country’s democratic 
development: Barrington Moore, whose works examine the role of the middle 
class in the construction of the modern era
11
; Almond and Verba, who focused on 
the role political culture and social capital play as agents of democratization
12
; and 
Putnam, who linked the performance of a country’s institutions to the population’s 
civic culture
13
. The limits of applying structural theories to modernization lie in 
their often deterministic approach, which happens when they deny the role that 
the actors – whether groups or individuals – may play in influencing a country’s 
development. The strongly deterministic approach and the attention on some 
predefined characteristics cannot by themselves explain the trajectory of a 
country’s development. A state can have a very high level of education but still be 
utterly repressive or even have a considerable economic capacity that concentrates 
wealth in the hands of a few individuals. For example, this is the case of Saudi 
Arabia ad some GCC countries. Moreover, structuralist theories do not explain 
phenomena in a dynamic manner but offer static explanations applicable to a 
particular period of time. 
Strong opposition to the modernization theories came in the form of the 
dependencia theory, the intellectual product of non-mainstream Latin American 
economists who analysed the causes of poverty and underdevelopment in their 
part of the world. The goal was to find a solution in order to alleviate the region’s 
dependence on the outside world. The key point of these scholars’ argument was a 
refusal of the assumption that foreign investments and free trade would enable 
countries to maximize their comparative advantage, which, in turn, would ensure 
development. In a context in which the theories of modernization became 
pervasive, the dependencia theory, which suggested adopting strategies of 
substituting imports that would have stimulated national industries, giving the 
state a primary role in the economy and decreasing the importance of external 
dependence, strongly contrasted with this approach, providing an alternative 
vision.  
The publication and dissemination of some works that had widespread 
reverberations even outside the academic world contributed to spreading 
                                                                                                                              
democracies endure?, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 1996, pp. 40-41) argue that 
poverty is a trap and that “poor democracies” (i.e. those with an average monthly income of less 
than $1,000 per capita) have low chances of survival. In addition, there was much discussion about 
the minimum threshold for a country to be on the path towards modernity.  
11
 B. Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Peasant in the Making of 
the Modern World, Beacon Press, Boston, 1966. 
12
 G.A. Almond, S. Verba, The civic culture, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1963. 
13
 R.D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1993. 
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modernization theories to the study of the Middle East. A landmark was the works 
of Gibb and Bowen, who in 1950 published the first volume of Islamic Society 
and the West, commissioned by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in 
London (the second volume would be published in 1957)
14
. The work was an 
interdisciplinary survey of the impact of the West on the Arab world and on 
Turkey since the 1800s. The aim was to offer an organic study of the life of 
Muslim societies. The overall project fell within the scope of the modernization 
school and was conceived as a regional history written from a Western 
perspective. The work was divided into three periods: 1) an analysis of the 
institutions of Islamic society in the 18th century before Western influence; 2) an 
examination of the impact of the West since 1800; and 3) an analysis of the 
current situation and the forces involved. The Arab world was not presented as a 
subject of historical, political or cultural activity but as an appendix to the West.  
Another excellent example is Lerner’s 1958 book, The Passing of Traditional 
Society: Modernizing the Middle East, which offers an all-encompassing 
explanation based on quantitative data and was, therefore, considered much more 
reliable and objective than other studies on the Middle East at the time
15
. In 
particular, Lerner denounced the Nasserist policies that, according to him, would 
have rejected progress by promoting a climate of violence and inciting a return to 
power for Islam and terrorism. Lerner’s vision promoted a narrative of opposition 
between discrete worlds and fuelled the contrast between “us” and “them” by 
claiming that only by promoting “their” modernization could they become like 
“us”.  
This study, as well as the aforementioned analysis by Gibb and Bowen, 
influenced subsequent works in this area and contributed to the development of 
the American Orientalist school. Even if some European scholars, in particular 
sociologists and ethnographers (also thanks to collaborations with the universities 
of Cairo and Beirut), produced a series of studies on the social evolution of the 
contemporary Middle East in contrast with the aforementioned perspectives
16
, 
these studies were not so widely circulated and had little impact at the time
17
.  
 
                                              
14
 H. Gibb, H. Bowen, Islamic society and the West: a study of the impact of Western civilization 
on Moslem culture in the Near East, Oxford University Press, London, 1950. 
15
 D. Lerner, The passing of traditional society: Modernizing the Middle East, The Free Press, 
Glencoe, 1958. 
16
 Among others, see E. Douttè, Magie et religion dans l’Afrique du nord, Jourdan, Algiers, 1908 
and R. Montagne, La vie sociale et la vie politique du Berbères, Editions du comité de l’Afrique 
française, Paris, 1931. 
17
 During the same period, economic and historical-political studies by local scholars such as 
Albert Hourani (Lebanon), Charles Issawi (Egypt) and George Antonius (Lebanon/Egypt) were 
published and became important reference points for scholars in later years. See G. Antonius, The 
Arab awakening. The Story of the Arab National Movement, Putman, New York, 1946; A. 
Hourani, Syria and Lebanon. A political essay, Oxford University Press, London, New York, 
Toronto, 1946; C. Issawi, Egypt: an economic and social analysis, Oxford University Press, 
London, 1947. 
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3. Democratization and the Arab world 
 
In the mid-1970s, a number of countries, including some developing countries, 
started to undertake processes that gradually put them on the path towards 
democracy. Samuel Huntington refers to these processes as “waves” of 
democratization
18
. At the time, democracy was imagined, conceived and 
“practised” as an immanent and irreversible process; it became a global discourse 
that, sooner or later, would spread to every latitude
19
. Democratization and the 
study of the processes behind it were so pervasive that a “transitology” school 
emerged during the 1990s
20
. The new paradigm foresaw fixed stages, very similar 
to those the theory of modernization had proposed. A first phase of opening 
(political liberalization) would be followed by a phase of regime change and, 
finally, a phase of democratic consolidation. The more facilitating conditions or 
prerequisites a country had, such as the presence of political and economic 
liberalization and a strong civil society, the greater its chances of democratizing 
were. However, the paradigm appeared to be too static and deterministic, and it 
was soon evident how the opening processes could lead to different outcomes. 
Some countries fully achieved democracy; other countries followed a path leading 
them to a sort of grey area between democracy and authoritarianism. This led 
some authors to talk about the end of the 1990s as a period characterized by the 
growth of “illiberal democracies”21 or “hybrid regimes”22. Furthermore, for states 
that had not achieved full democracy or for those where the process had ended, 
the process did not appear to be linear. In many of these, in fact, democracy was 
ineffective, and phenomena such as electoral manipulation, fraud, military 
presence and a lack of political institutions emerged
23
. Gills and Rocamora, for 
example, argue that the democracies formed in the 1980s could be defined as “low 
intensity democracies”: democracies with institutional and economic instability, 
subject to strong international pressure and, ultimately, with little chance of 
continuing as such
24
. 
                                              
18
 S.P. Huntington, The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. Vol. 4. 
University of Oklahoma Press, Oklahoma, 1993. 
19
 J. Johansson, Globalisation and democracy: an overlooked dimension, in O. Elgstrom and G. 
Hyden (Eds.), Development and democracy: What we learned and how?, Routledge, London, 
2012. 
20
 T. L. Karl, P. Schmitter, What democracy is...and is not, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 2, No. 
3, 1991, pp. 3-16; B. Geddes, What do we know about democratization after twenty years?, in 
Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 2, 1999, pp. 115–144. 
21
 F. Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 6, 1997, pp. 22-43. 
22
 L. Diamond, Thinking About Hybrid Regimes, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2002, 
pp. 21-35. 
23
 L. Diamond, M.F. Plattner, A. Schedler, Introduction, in A. Schedler, L. Diamond, M.F. Plattner 
(Eds.), The Self-Restraining State. Power and Accountability in New Democracies, Lynne Rienner, 
Boulder, 1999, pp. 1-12. 
24
 B. Gills, J. Rocamora, Low intensity democracy, in Third World Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1992, 
pp. 501-523. 
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While the global character of the democratization processes, the so-called 
attitude of “democracy-spotting”25 and the pervasiveness of the transitological 
school in academic debate pushed scholars to define it as a “paradogm”26 and of 
the 1990s and the first decade of the new millennium as a “demo-crazy era”, 
although the Middle East seemed to be an exception to the rule. In this region, in 
fact, the spread of this debate coincided with a period of limited political reform. 
In 1989, the first parliamentary elections since the 1950s were organized in 
Jordan; in Yemen, this happened in 1993. In 1990, the Syrian parliament was 
expanded to include 60 seats for “independent” candidates, and Saudi Arabia 
established an appointed consultative council. In Algeria, the one-time single-
party regime lifted restrictions on political parties and permitted competitive local 
elections in 1990. In 1991 there were free and fair legislative elections but the 
second round of the latter was then suspended as the military took over in January 
1992. In 1992 Lebanon saw its first parliamentary elections since the civil war and 
in 1996, Kuwait held its first elections in a decade
27
. In 1997, there was a change 
in government in Morocco. These openings, however, involved only some of the 
Arab countries, and a more comprehensive examination shows how the processes 
that were started were often only façade procedures that did not undermine the 
status quo of the ruling elites. Moreover, even where attempts to open up seemed 
real, as in Tunisia, the authoritarian tracks never ceased to be trodden
28
. 
These openings and the consequent closures were the pretext for a significant 
revival of primordialist approaches, which had a major impact not only on the 
representation of the Middle East and on the development of a certain narrative 
but also on the West’s political and economic strategies towards the region. As for 
the narratives, there was the birth of a second generation of Orientalists who, led 
by anthropologist Ernest Gellner, placed the weakness of the Arab state at the core 
of their analysis. For Gellner, the Arab-Muslim world had no hope of attaining 
democracy if it failed to detach itself from its traditions. In his argument, the 
scholar started from the assumption that civil society (as conceived in Western 
systems) does not exist in Muslim countries and that society in these countries 
                                              
25
 S. Levitsky, L.A. Way, The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism, in Journal of Democracy, 
Vol. 13, No. 2, 2002, pp. 51-65. 
26
 F. Cavatorta, The convergence of governance. Upgrading authoritarianism in the Arab world 
and downgrading democracy elsewhere?, in Middle East Critique, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2010, pp. 217-
232; M. Valbjørn, Upgrading Post-democratization Studies: Examining a Re-politicized Arab 
World in a Transition to Somewhere, in Middle East Critique, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2012, pp. 25–35.  
27
 T. Niblock, E. Murphy (eds.), Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East, British 
Academy, London, 1990; I. Harik, D. Sullivan (eds.), Privatization and Liberalization in the 
Middle East, University Indiana Press, Bloomington, IN, 1992; A. Richards, J. Waterbury, A 
Political Economy of the Middle East, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1996. 
28
 S.A. Cook, The right way to promote Arab reform, in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2, 2005, pp. 
91-102. 
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was destined to chaos and disorder – in short, to backwardness and the perpetual 
absence of democracy – because of its cronyism29.  
Gellner’s studies, along with those of Huntington about the clash of 
civilizations
30
 and of Pryce-Jones, conveyed the idea that in Islamic countries, 
especially those in the Middle East, the prospects for democratic development are 
limited. In his 1989 book, The Closed Circle, Pryce-Jones states that Arabs’ 
immobility forces them to remain in a closed circle of cultural, religious and tribal 
traditions
31
. At the time, studies on the Middle East focused more on geopolitics 
or regional conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the Lebanese civil 
war that, according this neo-Orientalist view, were the natural outcome of a region 
predisposed to violence. 
More broadly, these studies contributed to spreading the idea of Arab 
exceptionalism. According to them, it served no purpose to understand state and 
regional dynamics because such knowledge would not help to understand a region 
destined for backwardness and authoritarianism. This is certainly due to the fact 
that, for decades, the study of the area continued to provide interpretations related 
to Western paradigms (in particular regarding modernization, as discussed above) 
and Orientalist theories. Orientalists regarded the Islamic world as a cultural unity 
that they alone could decipher. As a consequence, specific aspects of the Middle 
East were studied. Often, they were abstracted from the regional context (relations 
within the villages, commerce, religion, the army, etc.), and the analysis was done 
without taking the State or the economic sphere into account and without 
analytically problematizing the theoretical aspects.  
 
4. “Arab exceptionalism” in retrospect 
 
“Arab exceptionalism” is inextricably linked to the development of area 
studies. The fact that the Orientalist vision became the lens used most often to 
study and read the dynamics of the area, especially after the end of World War II, 
played a decisive role. This attitude is linked to another element, namely the 
increasing weight of the United States and American academia in the study of the 
Middle East. US involvement in World War I helped in co-opting area specialists 
in various disciplines; the aim was to create ad hoc programmes in various 
American universities that included courses on the Middle East and its languages. 
Despite the joint efforts of the academic world and the government, however, 
Robert Hall wrote shortly after World War II that «the Near East is completely 
forgotten and there are only a few scholars who know this area thoroughly, except 
in the field of linguistic studies. Princeton University has plans and resources to 
                                              
29
 E. Gellner, Conditions of liberty: civil society and its rivals, Penguin Books, London, 1996, p. 
26. 
30
 S.P. Huntington, The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order, Simon & Schuster, 
New York, 1996. 
31
 D. Pryce-Jones, The closed circle: an interpretations of the Arabs, Harper and Row, New York, 
1989, p. 406. 
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fill this gap»
32
. A few months later, the first programme in Near Eastern Studies 
was created at Princeton University. Around the same time, two other important 
events contributed to the evolution of Middle Eastern Studies in the United States: 
the founding of the Middle East Institute in 1946 and the publication of the first 
issue of its research dissemination medium, the Middle East Journal, in 1947
33
. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the number of centres that directly or indirectly dealt 
with the Middle East in a systematic way gradually increased. But not even the 
birth of the state of Israel or the subsequent Arab‒Israeli conflicts led to the 
creation of associations and institutes until about 20 years after the Middle East 
Institute was founded. 
An important moment for Middle Eastern Studies came in 1967, when the 
Middle Eastern Studies Association (MESA) was founded in the United States 
with the support of the Ford Foundation and in close collaboration with the Jewish 
lobby and American intelligence services
34
. With the birth of MESA, some 
American scholars with specific training in the Arab world began to reflect on the 
fact that the major Middle East scholars in the United States did not come from 
the region and did not “speak for the region”. First in the shadows and then more 
explicitly through the establishment of the Association of Arab-American 
University Graduates, these scholars sharply contrasted with the ideological 
power of MESA. Among others, it is worth remembering that Edward Said, along 
with Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, co-founded the Institute of Arab Studies and that he 
subsequently edited the Arab Studies Quarterly. In 1971, in response to the 
Orientalist paradigm
35
, a group of young scholars and activists created the Middle 
East Research and Information Project (MERIP), which would periodically 
publish MERIP reports. However, while Middle Eastern Studies were becoming 
more and more politicized, the United States had a remarkable appeal for foreign 
students – in particular, those from the Middle East. One reason was certainly the 
many opportunities to obtain grants and scholarships, but another reason was the 
American programmes’ less rigorous approach. Unlike many of their European 
counterparts, the US programmes were not rooted in an Orientalist approach; in 
addition, they did not require that ancient languages be studied and offered greater 
freedom for individual research. 
It should also be emphasized that, in general, Middle Eastern Studies in the 
United States have benefitted greatly from funding by the most prominent 
American oil companies, which needed experts to better understand regional 
                                              
32
 R. Hall, Area Studies: with special reference to their implication for research in the Social 
Science, Social Science Research Council Pamphlet 3, May 1949, p. 17. Hall’s words are from 
May 1947 but were only printed in 1949. 
33
 See the MESA website www.mei.edu/about (last accessed 2.05.2019). 
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Winter 1987, pp. 40-63. 
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dynamics. In this respect, the most demanding was the former Arabian-American 
Oil Company (ARAMCO). It was also the most generous in providing loans and 
even required travel to the Middle East to learn the languages spoken in the 
region.  
Towards the end of the 1980s, studies on the Middle East became an area 
heavily contaminated by politics – to a much greater extent than ever before. 
Having questioned the Orientalist paradigm, above all thanks to the publication of 
Edward Said’s Orientalism in 197836, other primordial approaches emerged, such 
as the culturalist paradigm, which has its roots in the theories of modernization. It 
is interesting to note that the Orientalist discourse has changed its lexicon over 
time by abandoning the description of “other” contexts in racist terms and citing 
“cultural” reasons to justify the West’s supremacy over the East. In an essay that 
is based on an analysis of political culture applied to the Arab world and criticizes 
the approach, Lisa Anderson states that the spread of the concept of democracy 
and its alleged superiority has created a vicious circle, according to which if a 
state and its citizens do not strive to pursue democratic ends they are considered 
obtuse or perverse. From this point of view, the impossibility (or inability) of 
populations, anywhere in the world, to establish and maintain a democratic system 
of government is explained by forms of disability or immaturity in the population 
itself
37
. 
It was precisely on the basis of culturalist arguments that the politicization of 
Middle Eastern Studies produced an alliance between science and political 
decision making: The arguments of Huntington, Lewis and Halpern
38
, among 
others, fuelled the thesis of “exporting democracy” that took root in the 1980s, a 
period in which the Reagan administration started its “crusade for democracy”39. 
This campaign culminated in the country’s direct intervention in Iraq in 1991 with 
Operation Desert Storm
40
. American foreign policy has become intertwined with 
economic neoliberalism, which, especially since the 2003 invasion of 
Afghanistan, makes use of weapons and economic dependence to “export” 
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 L. Anderson, Democracy in the Arab world: a critique of the Political Cultural approach”, in R. 
Brynen, B. Korany, P. Noble (Eds.), Political liberalisation and democratisation in the Arab 
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Africa, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1963, x–xi. 
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 B. Gills, J. Rocamora, Low intensity democracy, op.cit.  
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democracy to the world
41
. However, as Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points 
speech demonstrates, it is an instrument that is far from new to the American 
repertoire. According to this view, if democratization in developing countries does 
not appear to have a positive outcome, it must nevertheless be supported by all 
possible means, including through the use of weapons and by interfering in a 
country’s economic and financial sectors. The result has been the creation of a 
dynamics of (above all economic) submission that legitimizes the market’s 
influence in its most invasive capitalist forms, according to a process in which 
capitalism is equivalent to democracy and democracy is equivalent to capitalism. 
Ultimately, the new world order creates a sort of new colonialism supported by 
economic, social and institutional practices
42
: unilateral coercion by governments, 
promises of an economic nature (from the threat of boycott to the promise of 
favours) in exchange for the protection of human rights and political 
performances increasingly oriented towards democratic principles. “Multilateral 
systems of political conditionality”, in the words of Schmitter and Brouwer, that 
can include or exclude states from a series of international and regional privileges 
and from being part of regional or international organizations have been 
instruments of coercion and control used on many occasions over the past 30 
years
43
. 
It is clear that the theories of democratization and of modernization have 
contributed to (re-)reading and (re-)ordering the relations between “West” and 
“East”. As we have seen, not only have they nourished the academic debate and, 
therefore, oriented the evolution of studies on the Middle East region, but they 
also have a significant impact on the development of political strategies targeting 
this region. As Hinnebusch states, it is undeniable that the post-1960s processes of 
nationalizing the economy produced a class of state-dependent crony capitalists 
for contracts, monopolies and other favours completely incapable of fostering 
development processes by promoting pro-democracy coalitions. At the same time, 
the dynamics we discussed above reinforced a representation of the region in 
terms of exceptionalism. In many respects, this representation is attributable to 
exogenous factors and the development of an asymmetrical and unequal 
relationship between the West and the Middle East
44
. 
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5. Upgrading the debate on democratization 
 
The debate on democratization has contributed to making the Middle East 
region “exceptional”. Between the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 
2000s, the stability of the region’s regimes and their resilience amid internal and 
external pressures produced a methodological and theoretical shift that had major 
implications for scholars and analysts. One of the most accurate reflections 
leading to this change within the paradigm of democratic transition, which had 
already been criticized in a well-known 2002 Carothers article
45
, came from Lisa 
Anderson. In her 2006 article, she questioned why democratization scholars had 
spent rivers of ink trying to include the Middle East (which did not democratize) 
in the paradigm of democratization
46
. According to Anderson, this theoretical and 
methodological frenzy had made scholars lose sight of the real forces that could 
have led to regime change, thus leading them to neglect the dynamics of society 
and of governments, as well as the ongoing transformations. In fact, work on 
institutions and parliaments and in civil societies showed its limitations. The 
institutions were weak and controlled by strong and top-down apparatuses; the 
elections were manipulated and served only to enhance the credibility of the 
leader and to legitimize him; the parliaments were a façade; and the apparent 
reforms were mirrors for the larks of international donors. «Arab incumbents 
quickly learned the lesson of what was expected internationally and adopted the 
‘democracy language’; talking the ‘donor talk’ became a prerequisite for political 
rent-seeking»
47
. A segment of the Middle Eastern population viewed democracy 
as a new and inevitable Western imposition.  
This awareness led democratization scholars – and, in particular, political 
scientists – to reflect on the fact that the regimes resistant to democracy are 
political and their actions are exquisitely political, and studying such dynamics is 
much more crucial than studying the lack of a democratization process
48
. If one of 
the characteristics of the previous interpretations (especially of the Orientalist 
paradigm) had been to read and represent Arab societies as immovable because 
authoritarian regimes were themselves immovable, the observation of the 
institutional mechanisms that develop within an authoritarian regime combined 
with a structural observation shows how flexible, adaptable and mutable these 
regimes are. This new awareness led to a methodological earthquake: «Eventually 
some of the erstwhile students of democratization in the Middle East […] decided 
it better to ask a different question: not ‘Why is there no democracy?’ But what 
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accounts for the persistence of authoritarianism?»49. This question stems from the 
reflections of democratization scholars who, in the aftermath of the third wave, 
did not ask why democracy had failed in certain contexts but rather how 
democracy had managed to survive in others. The attention, as Bellin highlights, 
should therefore not be so much on the search for the absence of prerequisites – 
essential elements of the theory of democratization – as on the search for those 
elements that “foster robust authoritarianism”50. The change of approach has 
unexpected consequences for the academic debate, opening up new paths and 
reflections. In this “post-democratization” line of enquiry51, attention has shifted 
to electoral processes
52
, development policies
53
, the impact of privatization 
processes
54
 and the manipulation of civil society
55
. This approach examines those 
political tools that underpin authoritarian Arab regimes. As Hinnebusch points 
out, (both the political and the economic) liberalization processes promoted in 
some Arab countries since the 1990s were, in hindsight, a way of replacing the 
democratization process rather than a step towards reaching it
56
. To this end, 
political elites have chiefly used economic liberalization, known in Arabic as the 
infitah, to build domestic legitimacy. Such a strategy has enabled them to 
compromise with (or incorporate) various sections of the population to build and 
maintain a network of political and economic privileges
57
. The most important 
theoretical framework to frame discussions around the survival of authoritarian 
rule in the Arab world is offered in Heydemann’s “upgrading Arab 
authoritarianism”, whose core argument is that the ruling elites are able, through 
selective liberalization, to renew their role and legitimacy in order to stay in 
power without offering meaningful political change
58
. Heydemann argues that all 
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the liberal reforms undertaken serve the purpose of strengthening the regime and 
do not generate the dynamics one would expect: Economic liberalization fails to 
produce a democracy-demanding bourgeoisie; civil society activism strengthens 
authoritarian dynamics; and political liberalization does not produce a 
snowballing effect. 
 
6. Conclusion. A return to primordialism? The 2011 uprisings and the sectarian 
option  
 
As we have seen, the attempt to explain the Middle East has produced, over the 
course of the 20th century, results that are not very useful to identifying both the 
real socio-political and the international dynamics that were developing in the 
various countries of the region. As Bill writes, «American analysts continue to 
explore their political empty quarter in search of the oases of knowledge 
necessary to explain political development in the Middle East. Eventually, these 
analysts all seem to end up at the same old watering holes, believing they have 
discovered new oases and giving them different names each time. In the 1950s 
and 1960s, the signs at the oases read ‘liberal democracy and Westernization’; in 
the 1960s and 1970s, the search focused on ‘political development and political 
participation’; in the 1970s and 1980s, the jargon was ‘legitimacy’ and ‘the state 
and society’ dichotomy; today, the words on the weather-beaten old signs are 
‘civil society’ and ‘democratization.’ We have come full circle»59.  
The 2011 uprisings triggered a methodological earthquake that showed, once 
again, that scholars had been looking “in the wrong place”. Years of study on 
authoritarian resilience had almost completely ignored the dynamics of subaltern 
actors who had gradually acquired weight within the societies. Most purely 
economic policy analyses that were too focused on rentierism or neo-
patrimonialism had also been neglected. An intra-paradigmatic debate developed 
immediately after the events of 2011
60
. While scholars of the democratic 
transition school have talked about failed transitions
61
, advocates of authoritarian 
resilience have rather sought to explain 2011 as a return to authoritarianism
62
. In 
any case, the revolts have exposed the weakness and inadequacy of both 
paradigms, which have proved too rigid to grasp those changes and the 
complexity of the facts leading to the revolts. As Paola Rivetti states, «This is the 
case not only because a different set of marginal actors—others than the ‘usual 
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middle-class suspects’ of mainstream democratisation theories—have been 
empowered as the protagonists of the protests, but also because contentious state–
society relations have been developing differently from the template provided by 
orthodox theories of transitions to democracy»
63
. 
By contrast, the outcomes of the revolts have shown the non-linearity of the 
processes in progress: The war in Syria and Yemen, the authoritarian return to 
Egypt, the Jordanian immobility and the “normalization” of protests in Morocco 
have shown how dynamics and processes do not have a foregone conclusion. This 
non-linear trend of the revolts and their uncertain outcome, the rise to power of 
Islamist parties and the appearance of the “Islamic State” have promoted the 
emergence of analyses that emphasize the most negative and dramatic aspects of 
how regional policy and geopolitics evolve and are often superficial writings 
serving a certain political vision. In addition, this approach ignored a number of 
important transformations that have been direct consequences of the revolts: 
among others, the renewed politicization of the Arab world, “street politics”, the 
“non-movements” and other subjects (such as trade unions) that previous 
analyses, which had focused too much on studying the institutional mechanisms 
guaranteeing the longevity of regional regimes, largely overlooked
64
. 
So, how to weave the threads of a fabric that has already been woven for about 
a century? Did the 2011 uprisings produce new watchwords, like those that Bill 
mentions? Today, the mantra seems to be one of sectarianism. The lens of 
sectarianism, beyond the enthusiasm for the revolutionary wave, seems to have 
assumed a crucial role in analyses of the intra-state and regional dynamics
65
. This 
is demonstrated by the flourishing of studies and analyses that place the sectarian 
version at the centre as an explanatory lens for Middle Eastern relations
66
. 
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Reading the Middle East in sectarian terms favours the religious dimension (clash 
between Shiites and Sunnis) and the “tribal” aspects of relations between states. 
This has had and continues to have important repercussions. First of all, because 
the attention on the sectarian dimension obscures other interpretative lenses for 
the study and representation of the Middle East, which has the effect of feeding a 
line of studies seeking to explain all the (political and social) phenomena present 
in the region in an all-encompassing way. Secondly, because the emphasis on 
sectarian groups essentializes social and political relations and gives us back a 
region (and states) in which the political dimension appears to be irrelevant. 
Finally, because it shifted attention to much more appealing dynamics from the 
academic and international research institutes’ point of view and obscured the 
interesting state dynamics that have developed – especially since 2011. 
Are we facing a new theoretical shift that explains little or nothing of the real 
dynamics in play in the countries in the region? Paradigms help to interpret and 
study reality; however, as we have seen, they become problematic when they take 
on a normative dimension and are tied to politics. The sectarianization of the 
Middle East risks once again tarnishing the most profitable lines of study (such as 
subaltern studies) by proposing a primordialist and essentialist reading that fuels a 
sterile debate at an academic and political level. 
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